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Insider Trading and Corporate Spinoffs 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper studies insider trading to examine undervaluation as a motive behind corporate 
spinoffs. We show an unmistakable increase (decrease) in the number of insider purchases (sales) and net 
purchases (sales) in the four quarters prior to a spinoff announcement. In addition, relative to a benchmark 
period, insider selling is significantly lower, and their net purchases significantly higher, in the three 
quarters prior to a spinoff announcement compared to other periods. We find that announcement period 
excess returns for abnormal net insider purchases are significantly higher than excess returns for abnormal 
net insider sales. Moreover, only firms with abnormal net insider purchases exhibit significant 
improvement in their long-run market and operating performance after a spinoff. The results suggest that 
undervaluation is an important motive behind corporate spinoffs and that it is possible to identify the 
quality of a spinoff firm on the basis of insider trading behavior prior to its announcement.  
 
Key words: insider trading; undervaluation; corporate spinoffs. 
JEL Classification: G14; G34 
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Insider Trading and Corporate Spinoffs 
 
1. Introduction 
The information-based model of Nanda and Narayanan (1999) implies that undervaluation is an 
important motive for spinoffs. If a firm is undervalued due to information asymmetry between its 
management and the market, it may choose to do a spinoff to get correctly valued before approaching the 
external capital market for funds. Empirical research is consistent with this argument. For example, Ahn 
and Denis (2004) and Burch and Nanda (2003) report a significant improvement in aggregate firm value 
following spinoffs. Furthermore, Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) find lower levels of 
information asymmetry and larger amounts of capital raised after spinoffs.  
This study provides complementary evidence on the link between undervaluation and corporate 
spinoffs. We analyze personal trades made by corporate insiders in their firm’s stock prior to the 
announcement of a spinoff. Since insiders have intimate knowledge of their firm’s operations, 
transactions that they make on their own behalf should reflect their belief regarding the future prospects 
of the firm. If their firm is undervalued and a spinoff is undertaken to enhance market valuation, then we 
expect insiders to increase their share purchases, or decrease their sales, prior to the spinoff 
announcement. Either action results in a higher net share purchase measure for the corporate insider. In 
addition, we expect to see a strong relation between insider trading prior to a spinoff announcement and 
improvements in the long-run performance of spinoff firms. If only firms with prior increases in net 
insider purchases exhibit a significant improvement in their long-run performance after a spinoff but other 
firms do not, then insiders may tend to intentionally trade on superior information regarding the true value 
of their firm. Otherwise, prior insider trading patterns may simply reflect a tendency for insiders to 
mechanically follow price increases or decreases. Finally, if investors regard prior insider trading activity 
of a firm as a useful backdrop for evaluating its spinoff decisions, then the spinoff announcement period’s 
excess returns should be expected to be significantly higher among firms with prior increases in net 
insider purchases.  
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The purpose of this paper is to examine insider trading around corporate spinoffs to test our 
hypotheses. We begin by examining insiders’ personal trading of their firm’s stock before the 
announcement of a spinoff. We define insider trading as open-market and private transactions by a firm’s 
top management. The sample consists of 187 separate spinoff events by 172 parent firms from 1987 
through 2006. The results show a clear and near-monotonic increase (decrease) in the number of insider 
purchases (sales) and net purchases (sales) in the four quarters prior to the announcement. Moreover, 
relative to a benchmark period, insider selling is significantly lower, and net purchases significantly 
higher, in the three quarters prior to a spinoff announcement compared to other periods.  
We investigate whether insider trading can predict spinoff announcements. We stratify the sample 
based on insider trading activity one quarter prior to the announcement day. Spinoffs with positive 
abnormal insider net purchases are classified as the “abnormal net purchases sample,” while those with 
zero or negative abnormal insider net purchases are classified as the “abnormal net sale sample.” 
Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that announcement period excess returns for the abnormal net 
purchases group are significantly higher than those for the abnormal net sales group, suggesting that the 
market views spinoff decisions by firms with prior abnormal net purchases as more compatible with 
shareholder interests. We also investigate the ties between insider trading activity and changes in firm 
performance around spinoffs. The results show that firms with abnormal net purchases exhibit significant 
improvement in their long-run market and operating performance following spinoffs. The results imply 
that managers know when their firms are undervalued and time their own trades accordingly.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related research and develops 
the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 describes the sample selection procedure and research method. 
Section 4 presents evidence on insider trading before the spinoff announcement. The results of the stock 
market performance and the operating performance around spinoffs are reported in section 5 and 6, 
respectively. Section 7 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
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Numerous studies, such as Hite and Owers (1983), Miles and Rosenfeld (1983), and Schipper and 
Smith (1983), among others, document a significant positive stock price reaction to the announcement of 
corporate spinoffs. There is considerable empirical evidence that spinoffs, on average, enhance long-run 
shareholder value (e.g., Burch and Nanda, 2003; Ahn and Denis, 2004). A variety of reasons has been 
presented in the literature to explain the value gains from spinoffs. Among the most popular are 
improvements in corporate focus (Daley et al., 1997; Desai and Jain, 1999), improvements in 
management incentives (Schipper and Smith, 1983), increase in investment efficiency (Ahn and Denis, 
2004), relaxation of regulatory or tax constraints (Schipper and Smith, 1983), facilitation of a merger or 
takeover (Cusatis et al., 1993), and elimination of cross subsidies (Daley et al., 1997), etc.  
However, as pointed out by Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), if these motives are the only 
ones behind the separation of a parent from its subsidiary, then any other type of divestiture should work 
just as well as a spinoff. Spinoffs differ from other forms of divestitures such as asset sells and equity 
carve-outs in that no capital is raised in spinoffs. Therefore, a spinoff is an especially appropriate mode of 
separation when a firm is undervalued because undervaluation does not affect the cash inflows to the firm 
since the “subsidiary is not being sold” (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999). Nanda and Narayanan 
(1999) develop an information-based model to explain the undervaluation of multi-divisional firms. They 
argue that diversified firms may be undervalued due to information asymmetry between a firm’s 
management and the market. Splitting the firm’s divisions into multiple business components will 
facilitate the market valuation of each component more accurately. Then the market value of the sum of 
the separated parts may be greater than the market value of the combined firm. One way to determine the 
undervaluation of firms that engage in spinoffs is to compare the excess value of firms prior to and 
following spinoffs. For example, Ahn and Denis (2004) and Burch and Nanda (2003) report that pre-
spinoff firms are valued at a discount. Post-spinoff, they report a significant improvement in aggregate 
value and the diversification discount is eliminated. However, there is much debate about the accuracy of 
the Compustat segment data used to measure excess value in most studies. This study provides 
complementary evidence to prior studies by measuring undervaluation using an approach that does not 
 6 
rely on the estimation of excess value. We analyze personal trades made by corporate insiders in their 
firm’s stock prior to the announcement of a spinoff. Since insiders have intimate knowledge of their 
firm’s operations, transactions that insiders make on their own behalf are assumed to reflect their belief 
regarding the future prospects of the firm. If a firm is undervalued and a spinoff is undertaken to enhance 
market valuation, then we expect insiders to increase their share purchases or decrease their sales prior to 
a spinoff announcement. Either action results in an increase in their net share purchases. 
Hypothesis 1. Insider net share purchases increase prior to the announcement of a spinoff. 
  
Studies dating back to the late 1960s and early 1970s, such as Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968), 
Pratt and Devere (1970), Jaffe (1974), and Finnerty (1976), etc., document that corporate insiders earn 
significant abnormal profits by trading in stocks of their own firms. More recently, researchers have 
examined insider trading around corporate announcements of asset sales (Hirschey and Zaima, 1989), 
capital expenditures (John and Mishra, 1990), corporate bankruptcy (Seyhun and Bradley, 1997), 
dividends (John and Lang, 1991), earnings (Penman, 1982; Elliot et al., 1984), equity issues (Clarke et al., 
2001; Kahle, 2000; Lee, 1997), mergers and acquisitions (Akbulut, 2005; Boehmer and Metter, 1997; 
Seyhun, 1990b; Song, 2005), and stock repurchases (Lee et al., 1992). Most studies report significant 
changes in insider trading patterns before the public announcement. For example, Lee et al. (1992) find 
evidence of increased buying by insiders prior to fixed price repurchase offers, and of their decreased 
selling prior to fixed price repurchases and repurchases that follow takeover-related events. Kahle (2000) 
show that insider sales increase and purchases decrease prior to issues of equity and convertible debt by 
industrial firms.  
Clarke et al. (2001) provide evidence that insider selling increases prior to both completed and 
canceled seasoned equity offerings. However, as Lee (1997) points out, the abnormal insider trading 
patterns around corporate announcements could simply reflect a tendency for insiders to sell (buy) and to 
mechanically follow price increases (decreases) rather than a tendency for them to take advantage of 
specific information unavailable to the public. One way to investigate this issue is to examine the relation 
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between insider trading and the long-term performance of the firm. For example, Lee (1997) shows that 
primary issuers significantly underperform their benchmarks in the long run, regardless of insiders’ prior 
trading pattern. For secondary issuers, only those with insiders selling their shares before the issuance 
significantly underperform their benchmarks in the long run, while the others do not. This indicates that 
primary and secondary issuers with insiders selling their shares before the issuance seem to be knowingly 
selling overvalued equity, while primary issuers with insiders purchasing shares before the issuance do 
not seem to be knowingly selling overvalued equity.  
In the current study, we examine whether the insider trading pattern before a spinoff 
announcement is related to improvements in long run stock market performance and operating 
performance of the firm around a spinoff. Our assumptions are that insiders are aware of the correct 
valuation of their firm at the time of the spinoff decision and that not all spinoffs are motivated by 
undervaluation. Whereas insiders of undervalued firms have an incentive to increase the net purchase of 
their firm’s stock, the motive disappears in the absence of undervaluation. As such, we separate firms 
where undervaluation is a motive for the spinoff from other firms by examining their insider trades. 
Significant improvements in the long run stock market performance and operating performance following 
spinoffs are expected in firms with prior increases in insider net purchases.  
 Hypothesis 2. Following a spinoff, firms with prior increases in net insider purchases exhibit 
improvements in their long run stock market and operating performance. 
  
Studies also suggest that insiders’ personal trading of their firm’s stock prior to a corporate 
announcement is related to the market reaction to the announcement. For example, Hirschey and Zaima 
(1989) find that most positive market reactions to corporate sell-off announcements occur in closely held 
firms with insider net-buy activity six months before the sell-off announcement. John and Lang (1991) 
present evidence that announcement day excess returns are negative and significantly lower for firms with 
insider selling prior to a dividend initiation announcement than for the remaining firms with no insider 
trading or with only insider buying. In the current study, we examine whether investors similarly regard 
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the recent pattern of insider trading activity of the firm as a useful backdrop for evaluating their spinoff 
decisions. If the market views spinoff decisions by firms with recent increases in insider net purchases are 
compatible with shareholder interests, then we can expect spinoff announcement period excess returns to 
be significantly higher among these firms than in others.  
Hypothesis 3. Spinoff announcement period excess returns are higher among firms with recent 
increases in insider net purchases.  
 
3. Sample data and research method 
3.1. Spinoff sample 
The sample is obtained from the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database which identifies 
spinoffs from news articles. We first search the database for all spinoffs announced by firms listed on the 
NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ between 1987 and 2006. The reason for starting in 1987 is because the 
Thomson Financial Insider Filing Data Files, where our insider trading data are accessed, begin in 1986 
and the nature of the study necessitates that at least one year’s insider trading data prior to the 
announcement date of a spinoff be available. Spinoffs involving a Real Estate Investment Trust are 
excluded. An initial sample of 524 spinoffs is identified. The following data selection criteria are then 
applied to the initial sample: 
1) We verify that each transaction in the data is indeed a spinoff by checking news articles from Factiva 
and Lexis-Nexis. Transactions involving tracking stock, equity carve-outs or distributions of common 
stock in other publicly traded firms that are not subsidiaries of the parent firm do not fall within our 
definition of spinoffs and are excluded, resulting in a loss of 28 transactions; 
2) A precise announcement date and ex date for the spinoff must be available from Factiva, Lexis-Nexis 
or the CRSP database. 58 transactions are lost due to the lack of an identifiable announcement date or 
ex-spinoff date or both;  
3) 30 spinoffs that are taxable are eliminated; 
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4) 8 spinoffs involving ADRs (American Depository Receipts) and 9 involving firms with operations in 
a regulated industry (SIC 4910-4949) are dropped;  
5) 28 spinoffs are excluded because they were undertaken to facilitate the parent’s or the subsidiary’s 
merger with some other firm;  
6) 11 spinoffs are removed because their announcement occurred simultaneously with other corporate 
information disclosures (e.g., the appointment of a new CEO, etc.);   
7) 35 spinoffs are eliminated because the subsidiary’s stock was trading prior to the spinoff 
announcement date; 
8) 33 two-step spinoffs are dropped;  
9) Another 7 spinoffs are removed because they represent cases in which one firm engaged in multiple 
spinoffs and the interval between the announcement date of a spinoff and the ex-date of the 
immediate prior spinoff is less than 1 year; and 
10) Finally, 35 spinoffs are lost because of an absence of insider trade in the five years before the spinoff 
announcement date.  
The final sample consists of 187 separate spinoff events by 172 parent firms. Fifteen parent firms 
have two spinoffs separated by at least one year. Panel A of Table 1 summarizes our sampling procedure. 
Panel B reports the frequency of spinoffs by the year of announcement.  
 
3.2. Insider trading data 
Insider trading data are obtained from the Thomson Financial Insider Filing Data Files, which 
include all insider activity reported on SEC forms 3, 4, 5, and 144.
1
 These data are available from 1986. 
The SEC defines a corporate insider as a company’s officer, director or any beneficial owner of 10% or 
more of any equity class of securities. Previous research, however, indicates that trades by large 
                                                 
1 The SEC has recently modified the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval ("EDGAR") system to allow persons to 
file electronically securities ownership and transaction reports pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(Forms 3, 4 and 5). Persons required to file notifications of proposed sale of securities pursuant to Rule 144 under the Securities 
Act of 1933 (Form 144) also may now file electronically, where the issuer of the securities is a public company. 
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shareholders who are not officers or directors do not convey much information (Seyhun, 1986). 
Consequently, this study analyzes only top executives’ transactions, where top executives are defined as 
chairpersons of the board of directors, executive directors, controlling persons, presidents, and anyone 
holding the position of vice president and above (Lee, 1997). Both open market and private insider 
transactions are combined together in our study because the Thomson Financial Insider Filing Data Files 
do not report these two types of transactions separately. Following Seyhun (1986), we exclude all 
duplicate, amended, inconsistent transactions, and any transaction involving less than 100 shares.  
In our analysis, we focus on several measures of abnormal insider trades. Following Clarke et al. 
(2001), we define abnormal insider trading as actual trading less expected trading. Trading refers to sales, 
purchases, or net purchases (purchases minus sales) by insiders. Expected trading is the mean insider 
trading of the firm in the 36-month period beginning 48 months prior to the spinoff announcement and 
ending 13 months prior to the announcement.
2
 Trading can be defined in terms of the number of trades 
(e.g., Clarke, et al., 2001), the number of shares traded (e.g., Kaestner and Liu, 1996), or the dollar value 
of trades (e.g., Pettit and Venkatesh, 1995) by insiders. While we examine all three measures, we only 
report the measure of abnormal insider trading using the number of trades. Results using other insider 
trading measures are qualitatively similar.  
 
3.3. Matching firms 
To compute long run abnormal returns, we follow the procedure by Desai and Jain (1999) and 
select four matching firms for each parent and each subsidiary in our sample. Only CRSP-listed non-
spinoff firms are used as a pool of possible matching firms. From this list of possible matches, we select 
the firm with the same two-digit SIC code as that of the sample firm and that is closest to the sample firm 
in market capitalization in the month of the ex-spinoff date. The closest matching firm is designated the 
first matching firm; the second closest, the second matching firm, and so on, until the fourth closest 
                                                 
2 For spinoffs announced before Jan 1, 1990, the benchmark period begins on Jan 1, 1986 and is less than 36 months since the 
insider trading data from Thomson Financial Insider Filing Data Files start in 1986. Our results are robust to excluding these 
spinoffs.  
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matching firm. The stock market return of the sample firm is then compared with the return of the first 
matching firm. If the first matching firm should disappear for some reason, the return of the second 
matching firm is used from that point on. Similarly, the third and fourth matching firms are used until 
they are exhausted, after which the return of the CRSP value-weighted index is used as a matching proxy.  
Following Desai and Jain (1999), we create a pro-forma combined firm following the spinoff by 
weighting the return of the parent and that of its subsidiary using their market values of equity at the end 
of the month of the ex-spinoff date. The combined matching firm’s return is created by weighting the 
return of the parent’s matching firm and the subsidiary’s matching firm in both the pre- and post-spinoff 
periods using similar weights.  
As a robustness check, we employ two additional benchmarks for computing abnormal returns. In 
the first benchmark, we use the CRSP value-weighted index return; in the second, the value-weighted 
industry return is used, where industry is defined as all non-spinoff firms that have the same 2-digit SIC 
code as the sample firm. However, we do not report the results from the sensitivity analysis as they are 
qualitatively similar to those reported in the paper.  
 
4. Insider trading before spinoff announcement 
Table 2 presents the analysis of insider trading in the four quarters prior to the spinoff 
announcement. The first three columns report the average quarterly insider sales, purchases, and net 
purchases, which are measured as insider purchases minus insider sales. The last three columns report 
insiders’ abnormal sales, purchases, and net purchases, defined as actual sales, purchases, and net 
purchases minus expected sales, purchases, and net purchases, respectively. Expected insider sales, 
purchases, and net purchases are the mean sales, purchases, and net purchases in the 36-month period 
beginning 48 months and ending 13 months prior to the announcement. If undervaluation is an important 
motive for spinoffs, then insiders have an incentive to increase buying or decrease selling before spinoff 
announcements. Consequently, we should observe significant abnormal insider net purchasing prior to 
spinoff announcements.  
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The first three columns of Table 2 indicate a clear, almost monotonic, increase in purchasing and 
net purchasing and a steady decline in selling in the four quarters prior to the spinoff announcement. The 
last three columns show that sales are abnormally low relative to historical levels in the three quarters 
prior to the announcement. In contrast, there is no evidence of abnormally high purchases. This may be 
due to the impact of insider trading regulations which deter insiders from increasing purchases when they 
have favorable private information about the firm. However, insiders do not act illegally if, instead of 
increasing purchases, they simply decrease sales. Finally, significant abnormal net purchases are evident 
for the three quarters before the announcement, primarily due to less insider selling. Overall, the findings 
are consistent with the conjecture that undervaluation is an important motive for spinoffs.  
  
5. Firms’ market performance around spinoffs 
In this section, we examine spinoff announcement excess returns as well as the firms’ long run 
stock market performance around spinoffs. We stratify the sample based on abnormal insider net 
purchases during the quarter prior to the spinoff announcement day. Spinoffs with positive abnormal 
insider net purchases are classified as “abnormal net purchases sample,” while those with zero or negative 
abnormal insider net purchases are classified as “abnormal net sales sample.” We then compare 
announcement period excess returns as well as long term abnormal returns between the two sub-samples.  
 
5.1. Announcement period abnormal returns 
Panel A of Table 3 reports the abnormal returns over different time intervals around the 
announcement of spinoffs. Abnormal returns are estimated using the value-weighted 
NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq index return and the market model with parameters estimated over days -250 
through -50 relative to the announcement date. For the entire sample, the average (median) two-day 
cumulative abnormal return is 3.24% (2.38%) in the window [-1, 0]. Both the mean and the median are 
significant at the 1% level. Significant mean (median) returns of 2.70% (1.89%) and 4.36% (3.94%) are 
also found on day 0 and in the window [-1, +1], respectively. What is remarkable about the 
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announcement period excess returns is the difference between the abnormal net purchases and abnormal 
net sales sub-samples. The average two-day cumulative abnormal return in the abnormal net purchases 
sample is 4.12%, which is more than twice that of the abnormal net sales sample at 2.01%. A t-test of the 
difference in the means between the two sub-samples and a Wilcoxon’s signed rank test for the difference 
in the medians indicate that the announcement period excess returns of the two sub-samples are 
significantly different from each other at the 1% level and the 5% level, respectively. These results also 
persist through the other two time intervals investigated, namely, day 0 and the time period [-1, +1].  
Panel B of Table 3 examines the previous results using univariate and multivariate regression 
analyses. Models 1 through 3 use cumulative abnormal returns over three different time intervals, day -1 
to 0, day 0, and day -1 to 1, respectively, as dependent variables. The independent variable, ANP, is an 
indicator variable that is set to one for firms in the abnormal net purchase sub-sample, and zero otherwise. 
All three regressions show a significant and positive relationship between ANP and abnormal returns, 
suggesting that firms in the abnormal net purchase sub-sample experience significantly higher 
announcement period abnormal returns. In models 4 to 6, we include ARPR, FOCUS, and SPINSIZE as 
control variables. ARPR is the parent firm’s prior annual return minus the industry-and-size matched 
control firm’s prior annual return. FOCUS is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the two-digit SIC 
code of the subsidiary is different from the two-digit SIC code of the parent, and zero otherwise. 
SPINSIZE is the spun-off firm’s market value of equity at the end of the month of the ex-spinoff date 
divided by the sum of the parent’s and the spun-off firm’s market value of equity. The results of 
multivariate regressions are consistent with those in the univariate analysis. In all three models, ANP is 
significantly and positively related to the abnormal returns. Furthermore, the results show that firms with 
a larger SPINSIZE experience higher announcement abnormal returns. Altogether, the results are 
consistent with the expectation that insider trading activity provides a useful indicator for the market to 
evaluate corporate spinoff decisions. Moreover, spinoff decisions by firms with recent increases in insider 
net purchases are viewed by the market as being more compatible with shareholder interests.  
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5.2. Performance of pro forma combined firms before spinoff 
Table 4 reports the results for the pro-forma combined firms. The results in Panel A show that in 
the three years pre-spinoff period (prior to the month of announcement), firms in the entire sample 
significantly underperform their benchmarks. The average (median) abnormal return one year before the 
announcement (month -12 to -1) is -15.19% (-8.26%). The average (median) abnormal returns two and 
three years prior to the announcement are -21.51% (-8.97%) and -21.41% (-16.07%), respectively. These 
returns are all large in magnitude and are statistically significant at the 1% level. More interestingly, as 
we shall show in Panel B and C, the performance of the abnormal net purchases sub-sample is 
substantially different from that of the abnormal net sales sub-sample during the pre-spinoff period.  
Panel B of Table 4 presents the results for the abnormal net purchases sub-sample. The average 
(median) abnormal returns for one to three years prior to the announcement are -20.72% (-12.31%), -
29.28% (-12.11%), -25.98% (-16.36%), respectively. All these returns are statistically significant at the 1% 
level. Panel C of Table 4 reports the results for the abnormal net sales sub-sample. In contrast with the 
results for abnormal net purchases, none of the abnormal returns in the abnormal net sales sub-sample 
during the pre-spinoff period is significant. Hence, the significant negative abnormal returns in the full 
sample appear to be driven solely by the results in the abnormal net purchases sub-sample. A comparison 
of the performance of the abnormal net purchases sub-sample to that of the abnormal net sales sub-sample 
indicates that, on average, the abnormal net purchases sub-sample underperforms the abnormal net sales 
sub-sample by 14.27% (p-value=0.08), 20.12% (p-value=0.08), and 11.85% (p-value=0.34) for holding 
periods of one, two, and three years prior to the spinoff announcement, respectively.  
 
5.3. Performance of the pro-forma combined firms after spinoff 
             After the completion of a spinoff (following the month of the ex-spinoff date), the pro-forma 
combined firms in the full sample significantly outperform their matching firms for a holding period of up 
to one year (see Table 4, Panel A). The average (median) abnormal return in the first year following the 
spinoff (month +1 to +12) is 9.31% (2.72%), which is significant at the 5% (10%) level. For holding 
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periods of two years (month +1 to +24) and three years (month +1 to +36), the average (median) 
abnormal returns are 7.78% (1.64%) and 12.43% (6.14%), respectively, and they are not statistically 
significant.  
             In the abnormal net purchases sub-sample, the post-spinoff average (median) abnormal returns 
are 7.35% (4.18%), 5.95% (1.55%), and 8.43% (3.45%), respectively, for holding periods of one to three 
years (see Table 4, Panel B). In the abnormal net sales sub-sample, the corresponding values are 12.08% 
(1.92%), 10.56% (2.89%), and 18.58% (10.59%), respectively (see Table 4, Panel C). However, none of 
these returns is statistically significant. Further, a comparison of the performance of the two sub-samples 
indicates no significant difference between them. Finally, when we compare the performance of the pro-
forma combined firms before and after the spinoff, we find that the abnormal net purchases sub-sample 
exhibits a significant improvement in market performance around the spinoff, whereas the abnormal net 
sales sub-sample does not. In sum, the results that have been presented are consistent with the prediction 
that insider trades reflect superior information on the future prospects of the firm.  
 
5.4. Performance of parents after spinoff 
We examine the post-spinoff performance of parent firms and their subsidiaries separately to test 
whether there is any difference between abnormal net purchases and abnormal net sales. Table 5 reports 
the results for parent firms following a spinoff. Panel A of the table presents results for all parents. The 
results show that parent firms earn significant positive average (median) abnormal returns of 10.57% 
(3.35%), and 16.36% (8.96%) over a holding period of one and three years, respectively, and insignificant 
average (median) abnormal returns of 7.70% (-2.18%) over a holding period of two years. Panel B and C 
report our findings for parents in the abnormal net purchases and sales sub-samples, respectively. Parent 
firms with abnormal net purchases earn average (median) abnormal returns of 9.34% (4.54%), 6.25% (-
2.18%), and 12.31% (5.19%) for holding periods of one, two, and three years, respectively. Those with 
abnormal net sales earn abnormal returns of 12.31% (2.54%), 9.90% (-0.89%), and 22.56% (19.04%) 
over the same holding periods. However, none of these returns is statistically significant.  
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5.5. Performance of subsidiaries after spinoff 
Table 6 reports the results for subsidiary firms. Panel A of the table shows that the sample of all 
subsidiaries exhibits a strong positive performance following a spinoff. The average (median) abnormal 
returns for the entire sample of subsidiaries for holding periods of one, two, and three years are 22.34% 
(12.24%), 19.56% (17.63%), and 19.69% (13.64%), respectively. All of these returns are significant at the 
10% level or better. Panel B shows that subsidiaries in the abnormal net purchases sub-sample earn 
significant average (median) abnormal returns of 25.93% (12.21%), 22.88% (27.53%), and 22.50% 
(16.44%) over holding periods of one, two, and three years, respectively. The corresponding abnormal 
returns for subsidiaries in the abnormal net sales sub-sample are 17.26% (12.24%), 14.52% (-0.11%), and 
15.39% (6.57%), respectively. However, only abnormal returns for a one year holding period are 
significant. Relative to parent firms, the market performance of subsidiaries is much stronger. Overall, the 
results indicate that there is an improvement in the market performance of pro-forma combined firms 
following a spinoff and these are due primarily to the superior performance of their subsidiaries. 
 
6. Operating performance changes around spinoffs 
In this section, we examine changes in operating performance around spinoffs. Following Daley 
et al. (1997), we use the ratio of operating cash flow (Compustat annual data item #13) to total assets 
(Compustat data item #6) as a measure of operating performance and call it return on assets (ROA). Table 
7 reports changes in ROA from year -1 (the year before the ex-spinoff year) to year +1 (the year after the 
ex-spinoff year) for pro-forma combined firms.
3
 Similar to our analysis of the firms’ stock market 
performance, we focus on the adjusted ROA of matching-firms. For each parent and subsidiary in the 
sample, we select a matching firm with available data on the Compustat annual database. The matching 
firm selected is the one closest to the sample firm in terms of market capitalization and the same two-digit 
                                                 
3 We concentrate on the ROA change from year -1 to year +1 since there will be a large loss of observations due to missing 
Compustat data if we examine two or more years around the year of spinoff.  
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SIC code in the month of the ex-spinoff date. We create a pro-forma ROA measure for each combined 
firm in the post-spinoff period by weighting the ROA of the parent and of its subsidiary with their 
respective market value of equity at the end of the month of the ex-spinoff date. Similarly, the matching 
firm’s combined ROA is created by weighting the ROA of the parent’s and subsidiary’s matching firm in 
the pre- and post-spinoff periods using the same weights. A firm is included in the sample as long as it 
has at least one year’s operating performance data before and after the spinoff.  
We stratify the sample into abnormal net purchases and sales, and report the mean and median 
change in operating performance (ROA) for the pro-forma combined firms from year -1 (the year before 
the ex-spinoff year) to year +1 (the year after the ex-spinoff year). The abnormal net purchases sample 
comprises firms with positive abnormal net insider purchases in the quarter prior the announcement day. 
The remaining firms are classified as the abnormal net sales sample. The findings are reported in Table 7. 
In the abnormal net purchases sub-sample, the mean (median) change in matching-firm-adjusted ROA is 
2.63% (2.20%) around the spinoff year. Both the mean and the median changes are significant at least at 
the 5% level. In the abnormal net sales sub-sample, the corresponding mean and median changes are -
4.31% and -0.95%, which are not significant at the 10% level. The Wilcoxon two-sample median test 
rejects the equality of median ROA changes across both the abnormal net purchases and the abnormal net 
sales sub-samples at the 10% significance level. Overall, the results in Table 7 suggest that only the 
abnormal net purchases sub-sample exhibit a significant improvement in operating performance following 
a spinoff. These findings support our hypothesis that firms with prior increases in insider net purchases 
have an improved post-spinoff long run operating performance. 
 
7. Conclusion 
We use insider trading to examine undervaluation as a motive behind corporate spinoffs. Our 
sample consists of 187 separate spinoff events by 172 parent firms during 1987-2006. If undervaluation is 
a motive for spinoffs, as predicted by the model of Nanda and Narayanan (1999), self-interested managers 
have an incentive to increase their share purchases or to decrease their sales prior to a spinoff 
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announcement. Either action leads to an increase in net insider share purchases. Consistent with our 
hypothesis, we find a clear and almost monotonic increase (decrease) in the number of insider purchases 
(sales) and net purchases (sales) in the four quarters prior to a spinoff announcement. In addition, relative 
to the benchmark period, insider sales (net purchases) are significantly lower (higher) in the three quarters 
prior to a spinoff announcement.  
We further stratify our sample based on insider trading activity one quarter prior to the 
announcement day and classify it into two groups: abnormal net purchases and abnormal net sales. We 
find that the announcement period excess returns for abnormal net purchases are significantly higher than 
those for abnormal net sales, suggesting that the market views spinoff decisions by firms with prior 
abnormal net purchases as more compatible with shareholder interests. Moreover, only firms in the 
abnormal net purchases group exhibit significant improvement in their long-run stock market and 
operating performance following a spinoff, suggesting that managers seem to be aware that their firms are 
undervalued and hence time their own trades accordingly. Overall, the results imply that undervaluation is 
an important motive behind corporate spinoffs and that it is possible to identify the quality of a spinoff 
firm on the basis of insider trading behavior prior to its announcement.  
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Table 1 Description of sample 
Panel A reports the sample selection procedure. Spinoffs are identified from the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. The initial sample 
starts with 524 spinoffs announced by non-REIT firms listed on the NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq between 1987 and 2006. The sample excludes the 
following cases: 1) the transaction was not a spinoff; 2) a precise announcement date or ex-spinoff date for the spinoff was unavailable; 3) the 
spinoff was taxable; 4) the spinoff involved ADRs or firms with segments operating in the utilities industry (SIC4910-4949); 5) the spinoff was 
undertaken to facilitate the parent’s or the subsidiary’s merger with some other firm; 6) the spinoff announcement occurred simultaneously to 
other corporate information disclosures; 7) the subsidiary was trading prior to the spinoff announcement date; 8) one firm engaged in multiple 
spinoffs and the interval between the announcement date of the current spinoff and the ex-spinoff date of the previous spinoff was less than 1 year; 
9) there is no insider trade in the 5 years before the spinoff announcement date. Panel B reports the distribution by year of announcement of the 
final sample of 187 spinoffs.  
 
Panel A: Sample Selection Procedure  
Initial sample 524 
Reason for elimination  
Not a spinoff transaction 28 
Unable to identify a precise announcement date or ex-spinoff date 58 
Taxable spinoff 30 
ADRs 8 
Utilities 9 
Spinoff undertaken to facilitate merger with some other firm 55 
Return data unavailable on the CRSP database for the parent on the announcement date 28 
Contaminated simultaneous announcements 11 
Subsidiary publicly listed before the announcement date 35 
Two-step spinoffs 33 
Multiple spinoffs by the same parent  7 
No reported insider trade in the 5 years before the announcement date 35 
Final sample 187 
Panel B: Distribution of Spinoffs by Year of Announcement 
Year    Number   Year  Number 
1987  5  1997  14 
1988  9  1998  11 
1989  7  1999  12 
1990  9  2000  15 
1991  5  2001  6 
1992  9  2002  5 
1993  10  2003  8 
1994  14  2004  6 
1995  19  2005  4 
1996  18  2006  1 
    Total  187 
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Table 2 Quarterly insider trading before the announcement of spinoffs  
The table reports the average number of insider purchases, sales, and net purchases per firm per quarter in the four quarters before the 
announcement of spinoffs for a sample of 187 spinoffs. Net purchases are measured as purchases minus sales. Abnormal sales/purchases/net 
purchases are defined as actual sales/purchases/net purchases minus expected sales/purchases/net purchases in the given quarter. Expected 
sales/purchases/net purchases are the mean quarterly sales/purchases/net purchases of that firm in the 36-month period beginning 48 months prior 
to the announcement of spinoffs and ending 13 months prior to the announcement. All variables are winsorized at the 5th and the 95th percentiles. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance of the test statistics at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.    
  
   Average    Abnormal 
 Purchases 
 
 Sales 
 Net 
Purchases 
 
Purchases  Sales  
Net 
Purchases 
            
Q-4 0.08  1.60  -1.51  -0.13***  0.02  -0.08 
            
Q-3 0.26  1.09  -0.83  0.07  -0.34**  0.61*** 
            
Q-2 0.17  1.07  -0.95  -0.07**  -0.40***  0.38** 
            
Q-1 0.18  0.76  -0.63  -0.03  -0.61***  0.64*** 
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Table 3 Announcement period abnormal returns 
Panel A shows mean and median announcement period abnormal returns for 187 spinoff announcements during the period 1987-2006. Abnormal 
returns are estimated using the value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq index return and the market model with parameters estimated over days -
250 to -50 relative to the announcement date. The abnormal net purchases sample comprises firms with positive abnormal net insider purchases in 
the quarter prior the announcement day. The remaining sample is classified as the abnormal net sales sample. The t-test and the Wilcoxon signed 
ranks test are used to test the significance of the mean and median, respectively. *, ** and *** indicate significance of the test statistics at the 0.1, 
0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. Panel B shows regressions of announcement period abnormal returns on ANP and other control variables. ANP 
is an indicator variable that is set to one for firms in the abnormal net purchases sub-sample and zero otherwise. ARPR is the parent firm’s prior 
annual return minus the industry-and-size matched control firm’s prior annual return. FOCUS is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the two-
digit SIC code of the subsidiary is different from the two-digit SIC code of the parent and zero otherwise. SPINSIZE is the spun-off firm’s market 
value of equity at the end of the month of the ex-spinoff date divided by the sum of the parent and the spinoff market value of equity. 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent estimates of t-values are reported in parentheses. Sample sizes vary due to missing data. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance of the test statistics at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Announcement Period Abnormal Returns  
Variables   
All firms 
(1) 
Abnormal Net 
Purchases 
(2) 
Abnormal Net 
Sales 
(3) 
 T/Z statistics for tests of 
differences 
(2)-(3) 
CAR (day -1 to day 0) Mean  3.24%*** 4.12%*** 2.01%*** 2.60*** 
 Median 2.38%*** 2.91%*** 1.82%*** 2.22** 
 No. of obs. 187 109 78  
AR (day 0) Mean  2.70%*** 3.72%*** 1.28%*** 3.68*** 
 Median 1.89%*** 3.00%*** 1.37%*** 2.65*** 
 No. of obs. 187 109 78  
CAR (day -1 to day 1) Mean  4.36%*** 5.28%*** 3.07%*** 2.15** 
 Median 3.94%*** 5.12%*** 3.18%*** 2.37** 
 No. of obs. 187 109 78  
Panel B: Regressions of Announcement Period Abnormal Returns 
 Dependent Variables 
Coefficient Estimates CAR(-1, 0) AR(0) CAR(-1, 1) CAR(-1, 0) AR(0) CAR(-1, 1) 
Constant 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 
 (3.30)*** (2.83)*** (3.86)*** (0.44) (0.36) (0.60) 
ANP 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
 (2.61)*** (3.66)*** (2.14)** (3.33)*** (3.60)*** (2.22)** 
ARPR    0.00 0.00 -0.01 
    (0.58) (0.57) (-0.60) 
FOCUS    0.00 0.01 0.01 
    (0.05) (1.10) (0.87) 
SPINSIZE    0.04 0.04 0.05 
    (1.62) (2.02)** (1.70)* 
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.10 0.04 
Sample Size 187 187 187 169 169 169 
EV
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Table 4 Stock market performance of the pro-forma combined firm 
The table shows raw buy-and-hold returns of the sample firms (RAWS), raw buy-and-hold returns of the matching firms (RAWM), and abnormal 
returns (AR) over several periods for the full sample of pro-forma combined firms as well as for the abnormal net purchases and the abnormal net 
sales sub-samples. The abnormal net purchases sample comprises firms with positive abnormal net insider purchases in the quarter prior the 
announcement day. The remaining sample is classified as the abnormal net sales sample. A pro-forma combined firm following the spinoff is 
created by weighting the return of the parent and that of its subsidiary using their market values of equity at the end of the month of the ex-spinoff 
date. The matching firm’s return is created by weighting the return of the parent’s matching firm and the subsidiary’s matching firm in the pre-
spinoff period as well as the post-spinoff period using the above weights. For each parent and each subsidiary in our sample, we select four 
matching firms. The matching firms selected are the ones with the same two-digit SIC code as that of the sample firm and are closest to the 
sample firm in market capitalization in the month of the ex-spinoff date. The closest matching firm is designated as the first matching firm; the 
second closest matching firm is designated as the second matching firm and so on to the fourth matching firm. The stock market return on the 
sample firm is then compared with the return on the first matching firm. If the first matching firm should disappear for some reason, the return on 
the second matching firm is used from that point on and then the third and so on until all the four matching firms are exhausted, after that return 
of CRSP value-weighted index is used. AM is the month of the announcement date. EX is the month of the ex-spinoff date. Sample sizes vary 
due to missing return data. Median values are shown in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance of the test statistics at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 
levels, respectively.    
 
Time Period  N  RAWS RAWM AR 
Panel A: All Firms      
AM -36 to AM -1 158 Mean 45.43% 66.84% -21.41%*** 
  Median [43.47%] [55.51%] [-16.07%***] 
AM -24 to AM -1 163 Mean 24.75% 46.26% -21.51%*** 
  Median [24.62%] [40.46%] [-8.97%***] 
AM -12 to AM -1 165 Mean 8.05% 23.24% -15.19%*** 
  Median [9.01%] [16.12%] [-8.26%***] 
AM 169 Mean 5.67% 1.23% 4.43%*** 
  Median [4.81%] 0.49% [3.54%***] 
EX 169 Mean 1.94% 1.43% 0.51% 
  Median [0.44%] 0.93% [0.81%] 
EX +1 to EX +12 157 Mean 18.60% 9.29% 9.31%** 
  Median [16.77%] [11.29%] [2.72%*] 
EX +1 to EX +24 131 Mean 29.68% 21.90% 7.78% 
  Median [24.40%] [27.06%] [1.64%] 
EX +1 to EX +36 109 Mean 51.61% 39.18% 12.43% 
  Median [43.55%] [40.25%] [6.14%] 
Panel B: Abnormal Net Purchases Sample      
AM -36 to AM -1 97 Mean 41.61% 67.59% -25.98%*** 
  Median [38.96%] [57.47%] [-16.36%***] 
AM -24 to AM -1 100 Mean 20.22% 49.51% -29.28%*** 
  Median [23.75%] [41.17%] [-12.11%***] 
AM -12 to AM -1 101 Mean 3.34% 24.06% -20.72%*** 
  Median [5.71%] [13.94%] [-12.31%***] 
AM 104 Mean 7.12% 1.78% 5.34%*** 
  Median [6.25%] 0.27% [4.48%***] 
EX 104 Mean 1.95% 2.19% -0.24% 
  Median [0.75%] 0.93% [0.82%] 
EX +1 to EX +12 92 Mean 13.69% 6.34% 7.35% 
  Median [11.67%] [8.96%] [4.18%] 
EX +1 to EX +24 79 Mean 24.78% 18.83% 5.95% 
  Median [21.49%] [24.07%] [1.55%] 
EX +1 to EX +36 66 Mean 42.48% 34.06% 8.43% 
  Median [41.00%] [38.51%] [3.45%] 
Panel C: Abnormal Net Sales Sample      
AM -36 to AM -1 61 Mean 51.50% 65.64% -14.13% 
  Median [46.16%] [50.00%] [-15.78%] 
AM -24 to AM -1 63 Mean 31.95% 41.11% -9.17% 
  Median [27.88%] [40.32%] [-2.01%] 
AM -12 to AM -1 64 Mean 15.49% 21.95% -6.46% 
  Median [17.01%] [17.70%] [0.15%] 
AM 65 Mean 3.33% 0.36% 2.97%** 
  Median [1.58%] [0.66%] [1.79%*] 
EX 65 Mean 1.91% 0.21% 1.71% 
  Median [-0.41%] [0.54%] [0.57%] 
EX +1 to EX +12 65 Mean 25.54% 13.45% 12.08% 
  Median [21.67%] [15.41%] [1.92%] 
EX +1 to EX +24 52 Mean 37.13% 26.56% 10.56% 
  Median [36.41%] [30.77%] [2.89%] 
EX +1 to EX +36 43 Mean 65.61% 47.04% 18.58% 
  Median [48.58%] [42.27%] [10.59%] 
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Table 5 Stock market performance of the parents following spinoffs 
The table shows raw buy-and-hold returns of the sample firms (RAWS), raw buy-and-hold returns of the matching firms (RAWM), and abnormal 
returns (AR) over several periods for the full sample of parent firms as well as for the abnormal net purchase and the abnormal net sales sub-
samples. The abnormal net purchases sample comprises parent firms with positive abnormal net insider purchases in the quarter prior the 
announcement day. The remaining sample is classified as the abnormal net sales sample. For each parent in our sample, we select four matching 
firms. The matching firms selected are the ones with the same two-digit SIC code as that of the sample firm and are closest to the sample firm in 
market capitalization in the month of the ex-spinoff date. The closest matching firm is designated as the first matching firm; the second closest 
matching firm is designated as the second matching firm and so on to the fourth matching firm. The stock market return on the sample firm is 
then compared with the return on the first matching firm. If the first matching firm should disappear for some reason, the return on the second 
matching firm is used from that point on and then the third and so on until all the four matching firms are exhausted, after that return of CRSP 
value-weighted index is used. AM is the month of the announcement date. EX is the month of the ex-spinoff date. Sample sizes vary due to 
missing return data. Median values are shown in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance of the test statistics at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
respectively.    
 
Time Period  N  RAWS RAWM AR 
Panel A: All Parents      
EX +1 to EX +12 157 Mean 18.38% 7.81% 10.57%** 
  Median [17.21%] [11.59%] [3.35%*] 
EX +1 to EX +24 131 Mean 26.90% 19.20% 7.70% 
  Median [22.65%] [22.71%] [-2.18%] 
EX +1 to EX +36 109 Mean 51.42% 35.06% 16.36%* 
  Median [42.30%] [41.33%] [8.96%*] 
Panel B: Abnormal Net Purchases Sample     
EX +1 to EX +12 92 Mean 11.51% 2.17% 9.34% 
  Median [14.24%] [9.06%] [4.54%] 
EX +1 to EX +24 79 Mean 21.48% 15.23% 6.25% 
  Median [19.42%] [22.08%] [-2.18%] 
EX +1 to EX +36 66 Mean 41.79% 29.48% 12.31% 
  Median [41.17%] [41.16%] [5.19%] 
Panel C: Abnormal Net Sales Sample     
EX +1 to EX +12 65 Mean 28.11% 15.79% 12.31% 
  Median [23.23%] [20.91%] [2.54%] 
EX +1 to EX +24 52 Mean 35.13% 25.23% 9.90% 
  Median [37.03%] [31.44%] [-0.89%] 
EX +1 to EX +36 43 Mean 66.20% 43.64% 22.56% 
  Median [48.97%] [41.33%] [19.04%] 
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Table 6 Stock market performance of the subsidiaries following spinoffs 
The table shows raw buy-and-hold returns of the sample firms (RAWS), raw buy-and-hold returns of the matching firms (RAWM), and abnormal 
returns (AR) over several periods for the full sample of subsidiaries as well as for the abnormal net purchase and the abnormal net sale sub-
samples. The abnormal net purchase sample comprises firms with positive abnormal net insider purchases in the quarter prior the announcement 
day. The remaining sample is classified as the abnormal net sale sample. For each subsidiary in our sample, we select four matching firms. The 
matching firms selected are the ones with the same two-digit SIC code as that of the sample firm and are closest to the sample firm in market 
capitalization in the month of the ex-spinoff date. The closest matching firm is designated as the first matching firm; the second closest matching 
firm is designated as the second matching firm and so on to the fourth matching firm. The stock market return on the sample firm is then 
compared with the return on the first matching firm. If the first matching firm should disappear for some reason, the return on the second 
matching firm is used from that point on and then the third and so on until all the four matching firms are exhausted, after that return of CRSP 
value-weighted index is used. AM is the month of the announcement date. EX is the month of the ex-spinoff date. Sample sizes vary due to 
missing return data. Median values are shown in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance of the test statistics at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
respectively.    
 
Time Period  N  RAWS RAWM AR 
Panel A: All Subsidiaries      
EX +1 to EX +12 157 Mean 26.88% 4.55% 22.34%*** 
  Median [21.82%] [7.58%] [12.24%***] 
EX +1 to EX +24 131 Mean 46.81% 27.24% 19.56%** 
  Median [44.36%] [22.58%] [17.63%**] 
EX +1 to EX +36 109 Mean 69.75% 50.06% 19.69%* 
  Median [70.71%] [49.43%] [13.64%**] 
Panel B: Abnormal Net Purchases Sample     
EX +1 to EX +12 92 Mean 30.07% 4.14% 25.93%*** 
  Median [23.09%] [4.65%] [12.21%***] 
EX +1 to EX +24 79 Mean 46.92% 24.04% 22.88%** 
  Median [47.02%] [21.68%] [27.53%**] 
EX +1 to EX +36 66 Mean 65.05% 42.55% 22.50%* 
  Median [68.34%] [46.40%] [16.44%**] 
Panel C: Abnormal Net Sales Sample     
EX +1 to EX +12 65 Mean 22.37% 5.11% 17.26%** 
  Median [20.18%] [9.17%] [12.24%*] 
EX +1 to EX +24 52 Mean 46.62% 32.11% 14.52% 
  Median [41.56%] [25.54%] [-0.11%] 
EX +1 to EX +36 43 Mean 76.98% 61.58% 15.39% 
  Median [70.71%] [53.52%] [6.57%] 
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Table 7 Change in operating performance around spinoffs for the pro-forma combined firms 
The table reports mean and median change in operating performance for the pro-forma combined firms from year -1 (the year before the ex-
spinoff year) to year +1 (the year after the ex-spinoff year). The abnormal net purchase sample comprises firms with positive abnormal net insider 
purchases in the quarter prior the announcement day. The remaining sample is classified as the abnormal net sale sample. Operating performance 
is measured as the ratio of operating cash flow (Compustat annual data item #13) to total assets (Compustat data item #6) as the measure of 
operating performance. For each parent and each subsidiary in our sample, we select one matching firm with data available on the Compustat 
annual database. The matching firm selected is the one closest to the sample firm in market capitalization and has the same two-digit SIC as that 
of the sample firm in the month of the ex-spinoff date. The pro-forma combined firm’s ROA measure in the post-spinoff period is computed by 
weighting ROA of the parent and that of its subsidiary using their market values of equity at the end of the month of the ex-spinoff date. The 
matching firm’s ROA is created by weighting ROA of the parent’s matching firm and the subsidiary’s matching firm in the pre-spinoff period as 
well as the post-spinoff period using the above weights. A firm is included in the sample as long as it has at least one year’s operating 
performance data before and after the spinoff. Median values are shown in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance of the test statistics at the 
0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.    
 
Year Relative to Spinoff N 
 
Unadjusted 
Match-firm-
adjusted 
Panel A: Abnormal Net Purchases Sample    
-1 73 Mean 13.10% -1.66% 
  Median [12.90%] [-0.42%] 
1 73 Mean 13.36% 0.97% 
  Median [15.03%] [1.20%] 
ROA  73 Mean 0.26% 2.63%** 
  Median [0.50%] [2.20%***] 
Panel B: Abnormal Net Sales Sample    
-1 41 Mean 14.88% 7.57% 
  Median [14.48%] [0.58%] 
1 41 Mean 12.88% 3.26% 
  Median [10.97%] [1.66%] 
ROA  41 Mean -2.00% -4.31% 
  Median [0.80%] [-0.95%] 
 
 
 
